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Abstract 
Activists and leaders in the far-right in the UK and Europe are often assumed to be working 
class white men (Cockburn, 2007). While this is reasonably accurate of the majority, the 
assumption has led to poor understanding of the active minority of women involved in the 
leadership and support of these movements. They have been similarly overlooked in research 
of the radicalisation process, which has primarily focused upon the Islamist radicalisation of 
men (Kundnani, 2015). In this article, literature relevant to the far-right radicalisation of 
white women is reviewed, beginning with establishing a base of pertinent research into 
multiple forms of radicalisation. On this basis, literature on potential radicalising pressures 
experienced by white British women is evaluated, with results reported on a micro, meso, and 
macro scale. Findings suggest these women are not necessarily misled by the men in their 
lives, ignorant, or pathological (Blee, 2003). They are individuals with their own agency, 
with something to lose, influenced and radicalised by pressures placed upon them by their 
lives, communities, and the world at large. The government’s Prevent strategy identifies 
white supremacy as the ideology of the far-right, an ideology which still suffuses the 
postcolonial Western world (Home Office, 2015). Despite its social hierarchy that imagines 
men as the pinnacle of civilisation, white women are not beyond its influence, as both victims 
of its patriarchy and enactors of its racialized oppression (hooks, 2015). These are pressures 
which affect the radicalisation of women in the far-right; they are as susceptible as men to 
anxieties stemming from the fading of the Empire and the legacy of colonialism.  
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In December 2016, the British Government for the first-time outlawed membership of 
a far-right group with the proscription of the organisation National Action (Allen, 2017). 
Nonetheless even as the UK counter-terrorism policy expands to further combat far-right 
extremism, it continues to grow as an issue for Britain (Abbas & Awan, 2015). Mark Rowley, 
retired Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, identified four far-right 
attacks foiled by police services in 2017, and warned that far-right extremists work in similar 
ways to Islamist extremists in their encouragement of intolerance and exploitation of 
grievances (Sandford, 2018). 
This intolerance and these grievances can contribute to radicalisation, which drives 
individuals from mainstream beliefs to extreme ideologies, and influences - though does not 
predetermine - the potentiality for violent extremism (Odorfer, 2015). This is a process in 
which people are influenced by their everyday experiences, their own communities and by 
the media, and by wider global and cultural pressures (Schmid, 2013). Far-right extremists 
are assumed to be white, working class young men (Cockburn, 2007). In part this is 
supported by the statistics of perpetrators of hate crimes, voters for far-right parties, and the 
membership and leadership of far-right groups (Widfeldt & Brandenburg, 2017). However, 
while more men become violent extremists than women, women may be as influential and 
influenced in radicalisation (Odorfer, 2015). 
Britain and Europe have seen women in leadership roles of far-right parties, such as 
Marine Le Pen of France’s Front National and Jayda Fransen of Britain First. Of six people 
arrested in January 2018 as members of National Action, one of them was a woman, and 
women have and continue to play a role in the activism of groups such as the English 
Defence League (Pilkington, 2016). All that this handful of women has in common is their 
ideology, which they have come to from different backgrounds and for different reasons. 
Women are inadequately understood as studies linking gender and the far-right are limited 
(Mulinari & Neergaard, 2015). Some insight as to their motivation comes from Prevent, the 
government strategy established to ‘prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (Home 
Office, 2015, p. 2). Though Prevent has been criticised as slow to mobilise in the face of far-
right extremism (Mythen, Walklate & Peatfield, 2016), it explicitly names the ideology of 
these groups as white supremacy (Home Office, 2015). 
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Rationale 
Women are under-researched in all facets of radicalisation and extremism (Carter, 
2013), and women in the far-right perhaps more so (Mulinari & Neergard, 2015). While this 
research found sources on far-right groups, radicalisation, and the Islamist radicalisation of 
women, as already stated the experiences and roles of women in the far-right are inadequately 
documented. There are some exceptions: Crown Prosecution Service figures in 2012 stated 
only 16.7% of hate crime defendants across all monitored strands of hate crimes were women 
(Roberts et al., 2013), however more recent figures do not include such a breakdown of 
offenders’ identities. Women in the far-right are a minority, but Miller-Idriss and Pilkington 
(2017) argue them to be not so much absent as overlooked. One of the few in-depth sources 
giving accounts from such women is the mid-90s research by Kathleen Blee (2003) in the 
US. This has been both a limitation of this research and a rationale for its pursuit; more 
studies are indeed needed. 
Without direct interviews of women in far-right organisations, other avenues of study 
must be pursued. This does not undermine the importance of their stories; Sedgwick (2010) 
names the stated grievances of Islamist radicals to be integral to understanding their 
motivations. Lacking many contemporary first-hand accounts, this research will focus on the 
processes of radicalisation of women on the micro, meso, and macro levels as influenced by 
the far-right’s motivating white supremacist ideology. 
There are reasons to question the usefulness of white supremacy as an ideology to 
comprehend female motivations. Ferber (2007) places it as a power structure prioritising 
white male superiority, while Hopkins (2016), examining perpetrators of gendered, racist hate 
crimes, supports this by placing masculinity and white supremacy as joint motivations. 
Aniagolu (2010, p. 180) confirms that white women have historically been victims of white 
men, but she goes on to argue how they have also been ‘partners in and beneficiaries of the 
racist system.’ As a power system it impacts white men, but white women are still influenced 
by how it prioritises their race and gives them a place within their society that is as racialised 
as it is gendered. It is through this positioning and influencing of white women in British 
society that white supremacist ideology will be assessed for its role in the far-right 
radicalisation of such women. 
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Methodology 
This research is a literature-based study which will examine journals, reports, and 
government publications in areas such as radicalisation, violent extremism, the far-right in 
Britain, Europe and the US, poverty and austerity in Britain, as well as critical race theory 
and the study of white supremacy and its influence upon women. Secondary research has 
been necessary due to the sensitive nature of the issue and the elusive nature of the research 
population (Fielding, 2004). Due to this need to draw on a broad range of sociological and 
ethnographic research, this article is not an evaluation of psychological evidence, but rather a 
discussion based upon existing literature. This is also in part due to a lack of robust research 
on the psychological factors in this radicalisation process, though the discussion may provide 
groundwork for such future research. Another consequence of the limitations within the 
existing research is that certain sources have been repeatedly consulted. Specifically, Blee’s 
(2003) work, as stated above, is one of the few in-depth pieces of research on the topic 
worldwide. The research of Busher (2015), Pai (2016), and Pilkington (2016) into the far-
right in the UK, predominantly the EDL, have also made them regularly-cited cornerstones of 
this article. This has been a necessity in this under-researched area, though efforts have been 
made to analyse their findings with a theoretical lens. 
The examination of white supremacy in radicalisation has thus required a thematic 
analysis. Braun and Clarke (2013, p. 4) define a theme as ‘a coherent and meaningful pattern’ 
in the data, and point out that themes are not hidden, waiting to be discovered, but 
constructed by the researcher. This approach is relevant where data exists that can consider 
likely motivations of people who are radicalised or the pressures causing their radicalisation. 
Despite the risk of subjectivity from this hypothesis-testing approach, Braun and Clarke 
(2013) consider this subjectivity to be a quality that does not produce an undermining bias, 




To examine far-right radicalisation of women requires some estimation of the 
radicalisation process. Developed from post-9/11 scholarship, such understanding is almost 
exclusively focused on Islamist radicalisation, usually that of men, influenced by the 
neoconservative paradigm (Kundnani, 2015). As such, terrorism motivated by politics or 
other ideologies has received less academic attention. This requires some examination of the 
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established radicalisation frameworks where they are developed or relevant for this research’s 
purposes. 
Research from Schmid (2013) for the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism 
summarises causes of terrorism. As well as religious motivation, he lists political oppression, 
social inequality and marginalisation, poverty, collective or individual desires for revenge, 
and modern circumstances making terrorist methods easy. These offer motivation, but no 
illumination on what may catalyse activism or political violence from a minority when there 
are many people worldwide who are subject to some or all of these pressures. 
The influential pre-9/11 study of the causes of terrorism by Crenshaw (1981) argues 
for a three-level account, involving factors of individual motivation and belief, decision-
making and strategy within a terrorist movement, and the wider political and social context. 
Even post-9/11 this framework has retained relevance, summarised by Schmid (2013) as the 
micro, meso, and macro-level influences upon individuals which lead to the process of 
radicalisation. Veldhuis and Staun (2009) describe the macro-level factors as preconditions to 
create a radicalisation-prone environment, while the micro and meso-level factors account for 
individual responses and behaviour. 
The threshold between radicalisation and terrorism can be vague, even though the 
concepts are thoroughly distinct, as is the term extremism (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). Schmid 
(2013) states that radicals need not be violent and despite shared motivations may be different 
to violent extremists, such as being willing to engage in critical thinking. The Expert Group 
on Violent Radicalisation can offer a concise working definition of violent radicalisation: 
‘socialisation to extremism which manifests itself in terrorism’ (Alonso et al., 2008, p. 7). 
This is supported by Pisoiu (2015), who believes individual radicalisation processes do not 
occur in a vacuum but derive from a social and cultural environment. 
Kundnani (2015) argues however, that these are complex factors, and there is little 
evidence to support the view that there is a single cause. Examination of the relevant 
radicalisation definitions for their usefulness or limitations in understanding factors in the 
radicalisation of women, the far-right, and both, is thus required. 
With radicalisation as a term only arising post-9/11, much of its development is based 
upon US scholarship (Mythen, Walklate & Peatfield, 2016), which may struggle to be 
relevant to the processes undergone by white British women. This scholarship has also been 
subject to politicisation; one of the more popular analyses is that the process of radicalisation 
is akin to a ‘conveyor belt’ that pushes an individual to terrorism, which infers a certain 
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inevitability stemming from ideology and disregards personal or psychological factors 
(Kundnani, 2015). It also avoids a need for a wider exploration of the causes of radicalisation, 
such as the culpability of government policies, by putting the onus on the individual. 
Sedgwick (2010) argues that, in the case of Islamist radicals, ignoring their openly declared 
grievances will inevitably present obstacles in understanding their motivations. 
These conflicting and politicised definitions raise the question of the usefulness of 
radicalisation and associated terms as concepts. Kundnani (2015) recognises that the word 
‘extremism’ has long been used in denouncing political dissent, such as Indian militants 
supporting independence, or Martin Luther King. This highlights the subjectivity of the term, 
if it was applied to causes which successfully challenged oppression; perhaps they are 
‘extremists’ only until they win or until it is politically imprudent to call them such. It is even 
defined as opposition to ‘British values’ (HM Government, 2015); in that way there is a risk 
of its usage by government policy to stifle opposition. 
Fekete (2015) criticises the European Commission for inconsistency in its counter-
radicalisation treatment of Islamists compared to white supremacists, where the former’s 
grievances against Western foreign policy is ‘not deemed legitimate but a symptom of their 
offending behaviour’ (p.92). Abbas and Awan (2015) contend that UK counter-terrorism is 
subject to institutional levels of Islamophobia which has led to the disproportionate targeting 
of Muslim communities. They go on to claim that Prevent’s misplaced focus and failure to 
tackle wider issues of far-right extremism have ‘paved the way’ for anti-Islamist groups such 
as the English Defence League. 
The strategies of Prevent in identifying and tackling radicalisation of all kinds come 
under further fire from Mythen, Walklate and Peatfield (2016) who believe it dismisses 
studies that have rejected ideology, particularly religious, as the root cause of violent 
extremism. They criticise the strategies for using data on radical beliefs from unsuitable 
sources, such as the 2010 Citizenship Survey, not designed for such a purpose, and claim the 
strategy does not seek to reflect or construct an understanding of radicalisation. 
These problems with definition, political bias, and practical policy are significant. 
Radicalisation scholarship is still critical to this topic, but there are specific challenges in 
using the research to comprehend an already under-researched topic. 
The involvement of women in any form of terrorism or political violence has tended 
to be ignored in the literature (Jackson et al., 2011), terrorist radicalisation viewed 
persistently as a male issue (Carter, 2013). This is despite the long involvement of women in 
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such organisations, from Daesh to their direct opponents in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, 
though they have historically been involved mainly in non-violent, supportive roles providing 
leadership, ideology, strategy, or motivation (Pearson & Winterbotham, 2017). Although 
their involvement has tended to be underestimated, there is a growing recognition of their 
complex roles in violent extremism (Carter, 2013). 
Within Islamist radicalisation, Nair and Chong (2017) have found in their research 
‘the seeming irrelevance of gender’ (p.1). This stands in contrast to much previous study, 
where female and male radicalisation have been viewed independently, with female 
radicalisation to terrorism often framed in personal terms (Pearson & Winterbotham, 2017). 
Nair and Chong (2017) recognised the possibility that a radicalised woman in their research 
was influenced by her husband, but declared the line of analysis to be ‘inadequate.’ Similarly, 
they found women were perceived to be radicalised to the Islamism of Daesh out of 
submission to men, with their agency or political commitment doubted, which was not 
supported by subsequent research. Assumptions of women being less susceptible to political 
violence due to more nurturing, forgiving or patient natures was also deemed ‘misleading’ by 
Nair and Chong (2017). Those involved in political violence are still depicted as exceptions 
to this nature, represented in media and academia as deviant rather than granted any agency 
or rationality (Carter, 2013). 
Evidence suggests that women who join Daesh actively support its principles, 
including violence (Pearson & Winterbotham, 2017). Similar research suggests that these 
women follow their own interpretations of Islamist radical ideology, with some 
commentators finding that women terrorists can be more ruthless and more efficient than 
their male counterparts (Carter, 2013). The reasons for these forms of Islamist radicalisation 
by women are complex where norms, expectations, and structural pressures may impact both 
men and women, but in ways which are sometimes highly gendered (Pearson & 
Winterbotham, 2017). 
The majority of the research, and that which has been discussed, has focused on 
women and Islamist radicalisation. This remains useful in discussion of far-right 
radicalisation of women, as it consistently recognises the agency of women and their capacity 
to engage in these extremist organisations in manners and for reasons similar to those of men, 
but which are still subtly and importantly different. 
Examination of the radical right requires defining it, which Miller Idris (2018) 
recognises as complex and varying across different legal, historical, and geographical 
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contexts. Rydgren (2018) discusses far-right movements as placing an emphasis on 
ethnonationalism rooted in myths about the past, wishing to strengthen the nation by making 
it more ethnically homogeneous and by returning to traditional values. They are often 
populist, anti-establishment, with an ideological core of authoritarianism stressing themes 
such as law and order and family values. Several threats stand according to them, against a 
nation’s identity, often immigration, and frequently immigration from Muslim countries. 
Identification by individuals and groups of this threat has been noted to cause levels 
of anxiety and intolerance that can lead to political intolerance and xenophobia (Capelos & 
van Troost, 2012). Miller Idris (2018) further notes structural explanations such as economic 
strain and demographic and social change as pressures felt amongst members of the far-right. 
Disengagement from politics and a sense of disconnect from society in its attitudes and 
demographics are deemed causes, though van der Valk (2014), researching in the 
Netherlands, found ethnic prejudice to be a more important motivator to far-right engagement 
than political ideas. Cultural factors such as a desire for comradeship and rebellion against 
societal norms are given importance by Miller Idris (2018), but she also recognises there exist 
specific individual characteristics which may make certain people more likely to espouse 
radical right views. 
In the UK, the murder of Lee Rigby by two Muslims prompted reactions not just from 
government policy but also the far-right, with retaliatory attacks against the Muslim 
community. This spiralling violence between Islamist and far-right groups has caused more 
attention to be paid to cumulative or reciprocal radicalisation (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013). 
Coined by Roger Eatwell in 2006, feelings of grievance and revenge are considered amongst 
contributing factors leading to acts of terrorism; this anger may then develop on the micro 
level of the individual and the meso level of mutual reinforcement of peers and ideological 
incitement (Sumpter, 2017).  
There has been limited work considering the radicalisation process among white 
supremacists, though a US study by Schafer, Mullins and Box (2014) identified the 
embracing of white supremacist ideology as a catalyst for radicalisation by those struggling 
with the previously discussed pressures. The influence of white supremacist attitudes in these 
movements can be felt in their socialisation of members to emphasise hate-directed beliefs, 
feelings, and behaviours, which can lead to a solidarity necessary for their collective identity 
(Simi et al., 2017). 
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Although UK policy explicitly identifies white supremacist ideology in the far-right, 
Abbas and Awan (2015) still accuse the policy of lacking depth and substance on the threat of 
far-right extremist ideologies. As discussed, they believe there to be failures in policy to 
tackle this extremism, which has allowed far-right extremist groups to gain momentum and 
support relatively quickly. 
Further analysis of the factors that contribute to far-right radicalisation will be 
conducted in subsequent findings, though the brief summaries offered here show consistent 
patterns in radicalisation, Islamist or far-right. Structural pressures of economic strain and 
social disengagement exist for many across the political spectrum, for example. Studies on 
radicalisation and its causes requires comprehension of the micro-level pressures felt by the 
individual, the meso-level pressures from immediate community and movements, and the 
macro-level influences from the broader global and cultural context, where regardless of 
ideology, there appear to be key similarities and unique differences. 
There will be inevitable differences between the motivations of women in violent 
Islamist groups and women in violent far-right groups, but some findings are still of 
relevance to this research. It is consistently found that these women act of their own volition, 
with their own agency and choice, and that there are similarities between their radicalisation 
and the radicalisation of men. White supremacist ideology suffuses not only personal 
experiences (Ware, 1992), but manifests within institutions and systems (Aniagolu, 2010). It 
has been studied by predominantly US-focused critical race theory, and Cole (2015) has 
questioned its usefulness in understanding racism in the UK, but it has still been identified by 
Prevent as the ideology of the far-right. The next three sections will, with the established 
understanding of radicalisation, examine the processes undergone by women in the far-right, 
and the role of white supremacy within these processes. This will be done on a personal scale, 
examining the pressures upon the individual women, a community scale, and on a macro 
level, of white supremacy on a global level and the position of white women within it. 
 
Micro-level Radicalisation 
Schmidt (2013) summarises micro-level radicalisation pressures as those which 
operate on the individual level, including identity problems, feelings of discrimination, 
relative deprivation, moral outrage, and feelings of ‘vicarious’ revenge. As he writes 
predominantly on Islamist radicalisation, he lists other pressures, but this research has 
selected these for their relevance to far-right extremism of women. Due to limited 
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information on the micro-pressures affecting these women, this section will include a more 
general examination of right-wing extremism, with consideration of its gendering, and the 
impact white supremacist ideology has upon these pressures. 
The value of the examination of micro-level pressures has been recognised by Blee 
(2003), who believes there to be a fallacious tendency to use macro patterns to understand 
micro behaviours. She argues that to explain individual recruitment into the far-right, the 
actual motives and experiences of its participants should be examined rather than only 
sweeping social trends. 
Explanations for the actions of known terrorists range from psychological to social 
(Bhui, Everitt & Jones, 2014), whilst Schmidt (2013) recognises that the number of push and 
pull factors for radicalisation on this micro-level is large. There is little research on the 
vulnerability of far-right women, though Bhui et al. (2014), in researching vulnerability to 
Islamist radicalisation, recognise a higher risk for women who experience social isolation, 
powerlessness, oppression, and limited alternative lifestyles. 
These arguments in favour of psychological causes of radicalisation have been 
criticised, with Bailey and Edwards (2017) arguing these models do not examine risk factors 
developing over time, or why some experiencing the same factors are not radicalised. Mixed 
findings on personal trauma as a fundamental motivation for women’s involvement in violent 
extremism were reported by Carter (2013). Blee (2003), in her research of white supremacist 
women in the US in the 1990s, found many women to be educated, with resources and 
connections; with ‘something to lose’ (p.3). The majority were not raised in abusive families, 
nor were they mentally ill. Blee (2003) states her uncertainty as to if mental illness, when 
found, was a cause for affiliation with the far-right, or an outcome of involvement with it. 
She rejects the ‘pathological individual’ as a mainstay of racist movements, instead focusing 
on a ‘pathological vein of racism, intolerance, and bigotry in the larger population.’ (Blee, 
2003, p. 192) 
There is often an urge to assume women are participants in far-right extremism 
because they are victims coerced by men. Even historically, this has not been the case; 
Gottlieb (2000) found the support by women of Mosley’s fascist movement to be 
characterised by ‘choice, free will and personal rebelliousness’ (p.7). This assumption mirrors 
some findings within more general studies of women’s criminality; Shaw (1995) criticises 
tendencies to oversimplify explanation of women’s crime and violence by portraying them as 
helpless victims. 
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The above includes noted scholars rejecting male influence as a major cause of female 
Islamist radicalisation; direct study of the far-right has not provided much evidence either 
way. Blee (2003) found great variety in her examination of reasons for women to join racist 
groups, while research by Pai (2016) and Busher (2015) into the British far-right include 
mentions of women involved for their own reasons, rather than at the urging of men. 
Pilkington (2016) explicitly identifies a number of women joining the EDL on their own or 
with other women, and not developing long-term partners within; their motivations and 
involvement remained independent of men. 
Odorfer (2015) highlights relative deprivation as a key cause of radicalisation, though 
most consideration of its role for the far-right has not been specifically focused on women. 
Prevent itself claims support for violent extremism is more prevalent among lower socio-
economic and income groups (HM Government, 2011), while Garland and Treadwell (2012) 
blame the growth of the EDL, in part, on the fall in living standards for the poorer of UK 
society. This will be examined as a wider cultural pressure in a later section, but Standing 
(2011) claims elements of the working class find their avenues to advance often blocked, 
causing senses of relative deprivation, anger, anomie, and anxiety that isolate them. 
Of interest is a claim by Miller Idris (2018), focusing on the youth in Germany, 
arguing that women who worry about their economic situation are more likely to express 
right-wing views. This may be linked to traditional attitudes deeming a woman’s ‘proper’ 
place to be in the home, which Moon (1999, p. 181) assesses through considerations of white 
enculturation and bourgeois ideology. Here the white home is a site of ‘cultural learning and 
racial indoctrination’, domestic traditions thusly influencing these women. Of relevance to 
their deprivation, Moon (1999) argues a white woman is socialised to desire a bourgeois 
construct of middle-class respectability, and taught to pursue this empowerment by aligning 
herself with white hegemony and supremacy. While of course this does not mean every 
impoverished white woman is radicalised by and in her own home, it speaks of a strain 
caused by deprivation that affects these women in a manner both racialised and specifically 
gendered. 
Conversely, Krueger (2008), rejects poverty as a motivator for terrorism; while he 
writes of Islamist extremism, not subject to the above influences, it is a warning that such 
explanations may be reductive. Perhaps a more valuable interpretation of the role of relative 
deprivation is from Vieten and Poynting (2016), who remind us that economic crises have 
historically led to the scapegoating of ‘others’. While they call this an ideological manoeuvre 
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that obfuscates the real causes of economic crisis, McLaren and Johnson (2007) remind us 
how immigrants are perceived to be the greatest economic threat to those of lower status. 
This is scrutinised by Pai (2016), who found many in her research directed their anger from 
economic threat not at white migration from eastern Europe, but non-whites, immigrants or 
not. 
Pai (2016) also found these individuals to believe the ‘English’ way of life to be under 
threat from these immigrants. Such opinions are shared by men and women with little 
variation; she interviews a woman nostalgic for the ‘good old days’ without immigration 
(2016). This is not a new phenomenon; Ambikaibaker (2015) reminds us of Enoch Powell’s 
‘Rivers of Blood’ speech and its claims the settlement of former colonised subjects were a 
sign of a ‘white racial and British national crisis.’ Heath and Demireva (2011) claim 
multiculturalism is believed in Western countries to have not only failed, but caused 
communities to entrench in their differences, corroding trust and solidarity. Kinnvall (2015) 
further draws a link between attempted multiculturalism and the anti-establishment stance of 
far-right narratives, that of a homeland of divided communities belonging to a people 
betrayed by government. 
This manifests in some immediate tensions, such as the EDL’s belief that the police 
dare not interfere with the Islamic community and they themselves are disproportionately 
targeted by the authorities and judged by society (Treadwell, 2013). This sentiment is not 
exclusive to the far-right in the UK, Vieten and Poynting (2016) finding similar attitudes in 
Finland, where the far-right perpetuate a narrative where the ‘true’ Finns are ‘victims, 
discriminated against in their own land by accommodation of cultural diversity’ (p.538) 
These narratives, argue Bartlett and Birdwell (2013), where both Muslims and the far-right 
view themselves as victims and the other as oppressors, can lead to the ‘cumulative’ process, 
driving each other to become more extreme, provocative, or radicalised. 
White supremacist ideology provides an explanation of how the narrative of the 
nation under threat may affect women. Ware (1992) reminds us of the role of white 
femininity as a symbol of white civilisation, which may position women to feel directly 
targeted. This is supported by Kinnvall’s (2015) discussion of these far-right narratives as 
framing the survival of the nation in terms of protecting women in ‘their sublime role of 
housewife and mother’ (p. 524). Women socialised to play a supporting role in their 
community may feel the pressures of a finding by McLaren and Johnson (2007), where even 
those who are not threatened may worry on behalf of others within their in-group who are. 
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The position of white women in imperialism and post-imperialist anxiety will be examined 
more deeply in a later section, but immediate attitudes of women in the British far-right in 
this matter are in need of further research. 
This sense of victimisation, of their culture under threat, is part of another concern of 
the far-right, recognised by Treadwell (2013) as the ‘dangerous Muslim Other’. As a form of 
racism, Frankenberg (1993) discusses this as ‘essentialist’ racism, the idea that people of 
colour are ‘fundamentally Other than white people: different, inferior, less civilised, less 
human, more animal, than whites’ (p.61). Gaston (2017) urges a nuanced consideration of 
these attitudes, recognition of where the beliefs are grounded in racial supremacy and where 
they may reflect discomfort, personal experience, or defences of liberal beliefs. 
Such ‘liberal beliefs’, however, can be hijacked for the demonisation of British 
Muslims (Tufail, 2015), if they were ever developed in good faith at all. Far-right groups 
often encourage women to maintain a traditional role in society, then confront Islam in the 
name of women’s rights (Allen, 2014). An example of this lies in the Rotherham and 
Rochdale ‘grooming’ child sexual abuse scandals, where popular discourse was dominated by 
the focus on the race, ethnicity, and dangerous masculinities of Muslim men (Tufail, 2015). 
Pai (2016) discusses the far-right myth that these crimes are mandated by a sharia law, 
claiming a direct link between the grooming issue and Muslim communities, a myth 
reproduced in British media. 
This contortion turns a scandal into a specifically racialised attack on white children 
from the Muslim community (Tufail, 2015), just as EDL protests against the niqab are 
identified by Pai (2016) as racism disguised as the defence of women’s rights. Kinnvall 
(2015) calls this ‘framing of gender issues as cultural concerns’ (p. 524) a chance for far-right 
movements to ‘securitise immigration’. Copsey et al. (2013) list further accounts from EDL 
members calling Islam a ‘child molesting cult’ who have ‘raped British women and children’ 
(p.26).  
It holds particular relevance for how it affects white women; here they and their 
families are made victims of encroaching, aggressive Muslim culture. Blee (2003) discusses 
similar threats in the US as familial concerns used to support agendas of racial supremacy. 
This can be found historically, too, in female far-right aggression. Gottlieb (2000) refers to 
appeals to motherly protectiveness and fear-mongering driving British fascism, or the 
transformation of ‘motherly love into motherly hate’ (p. 132).  
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Frankenberg (1993) reminds us that people of colour generally have more to fear from 
white people than vice versa, but this false narrative is not new, especially with the white 
woman as a victim. Ware (1992) writes about the racist perception of black men as a threat, 
not Muslims, but similarities endure; expressions of racism infused with metaphors of rape, 
the helpless white victim, and threats to women’s safety legitimating tough action. Gottlieb 
(2000) even refers to 1930s-40s antisemitism as reinforced by anxieties about sexual potency, 
with women ‘portrayed as the symbolic victims of a Jew-ravaged Britain’ (p.131). The 
‘other’ may differ over time, but the narrative itself does not necessarily. 
Blee (2003) examines how these attitudes affect women she has interviewed. She 
discusses how, in the stories of racist women, ‘members of racial minorities are most often 
linked to memories of fear, vulnerability, and anger’ (p. 85). Here, her narrative in the US 
differs little to that of Britain; assaults on men of minority races in retaliation for the threat 
they are presumed to pose to ‘innocent white women’ (Blee, 2003, p. 115). 
The micro pressures for radicalisation then, are in the white woman experiencing 
relative deprivation as a strain on her position domestically, a victim in her own society, beset 
by anxiety that her English way of life and her own body or family are under threat from the 
ideologies and individuals of the dangerous Muslim ‘other’. Beyond that lie the countless and 
unique personal vulnerabilities of the individual, socially and psychologically. 
To discuss micro-level causes of far-right radicalisation has required examination of 
that which is studied; namely groups such as the EDL and Britain First, predominantly drawn 
from the British working class (Pai, 2016). This leads to a perhaps disproportionate focus 
upon the racism of the poor, even though Flemmen and Savage (2017) reject the view that the 
white working class are especially more xenophobic. As discussed, Krueger (2008) rejects 
poverty as a cause of terrorism; he further rejects a lack of education and other forms of 
inequality as influences. 
On the matter of women, Blee may have been interviewing women in 1990s US, but 
her finding that there was, amongst them, ‘no single racist type’ (Blee, 2003, p. 7) is likely 
not irrelevant to the complexities of the UK twenty years later. A lack of research on women 
in the UK makes it particularly difficult to examine the micro-level pressures they feel. 
Lacking these stories of women who demonstrably exist within these groups and 
communities prompts research to examine wider social pressures, and many of these topics 
will be re-examined on a macro scale in a later section. 
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Meso-level Radicalisation 
Despite these pressures, Busher (2015) points out that membership of far-right groups 
is usually impacted by one’s social circles, while even angry declarations shouted in racist 
attacks are mirrored by the common ideology of government and media (Burnett, 2017). Blee 
(2003) confirms the involvement of women in racist politics to be influenced by where they 
lived, or worked, or partied; who their friends were. 
Recruitment leads to deeper conviction: Busher (2015) reports far-right beliefs 
emerging, intensifying and defining after joining the EDL. Surface attitudes may speak of 
community and connection, but underneath far-right groups is often what Simi et al. (2017) 
call a ‘deeper culture of hate and violence’ (p.1167), a collective identity that becomes all-
encompassing. Once involved, it can be harder to leave on both a social and ideological level. 
Pilkington (2016, p. 30) reports how gender identity in such groups can be ‘constraining’, 
many women at some point romantically involved with men in the movement and this 
affecting their position. They may be pushed into supportive roles, especially if the 
relationship leads to a family, and their involvement in the movement is seen as secondary to 
activist men. The impact is not particularly detailed, however, and she identifies several 
women who remained active independent of any men. 
The beliefs espoused often consist of nostalgia that scapegoats others (Gaston, 2017), 
though Givens (2004), talking of political parties more than extremist groups, points out this 
is not necessarily attractive to female voters.  Miller-Idris and Pilkington (2017) believe there 
to have been a recent reframing of femininity and women’s roles in groups such as the EDL; 
this research has already examined the far-right’s adoption of gender equality arguments to 
‘expose’ oppressive Islam. A practical example of the harnessing of femininity is identified 
by Allen (2017) with National Action’s ‘Miss Hitler’ beauty competition, in which women 
participated and demonstrated themselves fully entrenched in the traditionalist ideology - 
even that of staying at home and raising the next generation of white children. As performers 
and standard-bearers of idealised white beauty, the opinions they expressed were no less 
racist than those of male members of the group. In the US, Blee (2003) confirms subjects of 
her interviews to have joined male-dominated racist groups not ignorant of their interests as 
women, but that they reassessed their self-interests to fit these masculine agendas. 
This reassessment is easier as membership builds an entrenched sense of community, 
with feelings of pride and cohesion catalysing and sustaining participation (Busher, 2015). 
Simi et al. (2017) identify how involvement in the far-right includes a ‘complete identity 
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transformation’, individuals subsumed into the group. From there, members can grow 
increasingly isolated; Busher (2015) discovered that the EDL became the focal point of an 
activists’ social life, often at the expense of other relationships. Many of them found this 
participation created strains and stresses in their relationships at home and at work, only 
isolating them further from mainstream society and driving them deeper into the group. 
This collective identity causing further involvement and action is discussed by Carter 
(2015), examining group discussions where risk taking or political opinion often result in a 
shift in the average opinion toward increased extremism in the direction of the general 
consensus. Busher (2015) reinforces this with the idea that sometimes violent forms of 
political action are emerging through echo-chambers, activists either exchanging ideas with 
the like-minded or polarised by heated confrontations with their opponents. 
Busher (2015) also finds the sharing of information between the like-minded on social 
media to build common purpose, and validate anxiety, loathing, disdain and so forth. These 
become platforms for the curious to discover more on the far-right movements, and can be a 
breeding ground for recruitment and extremist sentiment. Saltman (2016), however, questions 
whether an organisation’s propaganda alone is sufficient for radicalisation, criticising 
reductionist claims by media and the public that the internet causes any initial spark for 
radicalisation. She does accept its role in facilitating the continuation of radicalisation. 
Pilkington (2016) notes female members of the EDL are more active online; as they 
are less exposed to the activism of demonstrations, theirs may be a specific and potentially 
different experience to the average male activist. A role for them may be inferred from 
Pearson and Winterbotham’s (2017) research into Islamist radicalisation of women, where 
they note that once recruited, women and girls were more able to successfully recruit other 
women online, knowing what had worked for them. Likewise, they found young women tend 
to have larger online social networks, and spend more time messaging online, implying 
potentially greater susceptibility. 
Such shared opinions on social media are not always from within a self-contained 
bubble; the three most common phrases used to attack Twitter users were ‘Muslim paedos’, 
‘Muslim terrorists’ and ‘Muslim scum’. Some 28% of these Islamophobic tweets were posted 
by women (Cole, 2015). This Islamophobia is not only part of mainstream society in social 
media, but mainstream media itself; Sumpter (2017) points out a tweet of Katie Hopkins after 
the 2017 Manchester bombing where she calls on Western men to ‘rise up’ to protect their 
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wives, daughters, and sons. Here mainstream media reinforces the racialised notion of the 
white woman and her family as victims. 
Despite circulation of opinions such as this from a broadcaster, Burnett (2017) 
believes the role of the media is ignored in any discussion of a climate that can lead to racial 
violence. This limits opportunities by individuals or society to understand fascist ideologies 
and racism, lacking sensitivity to ‘the interconnection of politics, culture, and the mass 
media’ (Ware and Back, 2002, p. 97). Cockburn (2007) opines that racism is not just 
characteristic of extremist parties and their members, but belongs to white people in the 
political left, right, and centre, and is reinforced by the mass media. Years later, Pai (2016) 
reinforces that, saying the racism in the core ideology of the EDL has been mainstreamed, 
‘permanently echoed in our public sphere’ (p.288). 
These stories are often seized by far-right activists if they coincide with their pre-
existing claims and beliefs (Busher, 2015), right-of-centre newspapers particularly popular 
when they report on issues which resonate not just in subject matter, but also invoke fear, 
outrage, and moral shock. The use of the scandals of Rotherham and Rochdale were 
discussed previously, and Tufail (2015) calls the aftermath of The Times’ investigation to be 
‘oxygen for the far-right’ (p.32). Simply put by Blee (2003), when the racist activist women 
she interviewed spoke of racial minorities as threats to safety or way of life, they sounded 
very much like mainstream racist whites. This supports the argument of Miller-Idris and 
Pilkington (2017) that the mainstreaming of racist ideas reduces stigmatisation that has 
typically discouraged women from participating in the radical right. 
 
White Supremacy on a Macro-Level 
Even in examination of personal and social pressures, this research has focused upon 
white supremacist society as a fundamental influence on the lives of white women, from their 
personal experiences to life in their communities to the media they consume. There is little on 
the micro or meso level of influences that white supremacist ideology does not affect, 
especially in the context of white Britons seeking a sense of national pride in the wake of 
Brexit, and before that the waning of Empire. White supremacy is a part of this national 
pride, as a hierarchy of a capitalist patriarchy placing men, adults, and whites as the powerful 
above women, children, and blacks and non-whites (hooks, 2015). As such, white women are 
both empowered and oppressed by varying degrees. 
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The ‘whiteness’ by which they identify themselves and aspire to is a construct, 
changing with its historical context (Hage, 1998), desirable as it provides the comfort and 
security of conforming (Ware & Back, 2002), and the status from colonial-era power even in 
a postcolonial age (Lopez, 2005). It is relevant to this research that, while skin colour can be 
a factor, it is not necessarily the cause of Islamophobia, and the wider construct of 
‘whiteness’ is still relevant to this prejudice (Cole, 2015). Those within whiteness do not 
often examine it, and it is usually most visible to those excluded by it, or experiencing 
violence by it (Frankenberg, 1993). Ignorant though they might be, white women’s lives are 
still shaped by race (Frankenberg, 1993), and they often bond on the basis of this shared 
racial identity, even if they are unconscious of its significance (hooks, 2015). Aniagolu 
(2010), on the other hand, accuses white women of understanding that they are beneficiaries 
of the racial system of power and privilege created and controlled by white men. 
These white, heterosexual European males are imagined at the top of the ‘racial tree 
of superiority’, the pinnacle of civilisation and racialised privilege and culture, but white 
women still have a role, essential for reproducing this superiority both biologically and 
culturally (Byrne, 2006, p. 24). They have undeniably been victims of the patriarchy, but 
historically have still supported practices of racism in the west, be it by association or 
outright participation.  
Within political activism, Gottlieb (2000) believes the place of women in fascist 
policy cannot be examined in isolation from male constructs of gender and masculinity. They 
are entrenched within it, oppressed by and benefiting from it. Blee’s (2000) examination of 
these groups identifies Aryan masculinity as ‘venerated’ (p.112) as the bedrock of the white 
race, and typically the role of women here is defined by their association with men - as wives, 
mothers, as supporters of the activism of racist men, their own activism secondary. But being 
of lesser importance within white supremacy is not the same as being unaffected by it, and 
Frankenberg (1993) claims white women to be, ‘by definition, practitioners of white culture’ 
(p.228).  
This research has already examined women as symbols of white culture, specifically 
white women as victims. Ware (1992) believes the construct of women as victims builds the 
image of a white way of life under threat; it is not about the danger to the individual, but the 
danger to white culture. Blee (2000) points out that this use of women as symbols is more for 
the benefit of men, a ‘statement to and about men’ (p.115), justifying their racial violence to 
maintain white male superiority. It plays a role in the practice of constructing the ‘other’ into 
THE FAR-RIGHT RADICALISATION OF WOMEN 104 
 
 
Stinton, C. (2019). Combining the aberrant with the ordinary: The role of white supremacy in the far-right 
radicalisation of women. Journal of Applied Psychology and Social Science, 5(1), 86-115 
as much of an object as possible (Hage, 1998), and Byrne (2006) accused this position of 
women as changing when it suits white men; for women to be victims to create a racial threat, 
or to be bedrocks of culture in reproducing white superiority. 
Although the role of women here is weaponised for the benefit of men, there is still an 
impact on women. Women of colour are explicitly excluded from this construct of 
victimhood (hooks, 2015), creating a hierarchy within women. hooks (2015) also examines 
the bonding of white women as victims, which allows them to ‘abdicate responsibility’ (p.46) 
for their role in the maintenance and perpetuation of sexism, racism, and classism. In 
consequence they participate in the othering of non-white men and are implicitly discouraged 
from challenging this. 
The historical context of white supremacy has some relevance, especially considering 
the tendency of the far-right to invoke nostalgia. Lopez (2005) claims that it is ‘beyond 
argument’ (p.6) that European colonialism was a white and racist undertaking, while Hage 
(1998) identifies how to be ‘white’ is to be an ideal bearer of Western civilisation. He calls it 
a fantasy position, but one that is yearned for by those eligible for such an identity, and that it 
is perpetuated by practices that reinforce racial hierarchy, including violence. Gender plays a 
crucial role in organising ‘race’ and ‘civilisation’, women involved in many different ways in 
the expansion and maintenance of the British Empire historically. For instance, as above with 
considerations of white women as victims, this alleged danger has been used to justify formal 
regulation of relations between races (Ware, 1992). 
Furthermore, white women were also representatives and symbols of white 
imperialism and colonialism. Ware (1992) claims this was not only in a reproductive 
capacity, but so long as they were of the right class and breeding, they were, in a colonial 
context, a guarantee of British morals and principles. In a 1930s fashion magazine in Kenya, 
Ware (1992) identifies a depiction of white women in superiority to black men, the white 
women a symbol of white people’s rule over the country. 
Byrne (2006) agrees that middle-class white women played ‘a central role in 
articulating national/imperial identity’ (p.142). She points out how the domestic played a key 
role in the ‘civilising’ mission of empire, white middle class female domesticity something to 
be aspired to - and enforced. This research has already examined the work of Moon (1999) on 
domestic life as a means of reinforcing white bourgeois attitudes on women, making this in 
some form a legacy of white femininity in imperialism. One of the best examples of 
postcolonial reverence of white femininity has been, according to Roberts (2005), the 
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reaction to the death of Princess Diana, who provided ‘a perfect image upon which a nation 
displaces its longing for better days, days of white English beauty, glamour, power’ (p.39). 
Roberts (2005) goes on to claim that ‘we are still worshipping the white goddess, whatever 
names we give them’ (p.48); white women do not necessarily require agency to be symbols 
of white supremacy, and a history of imperialism encourages them to reinforce its hierarchy. 
Western feminism does not always reject these influences sufficiently. Ware (1992) 
points out that feminism has dealt with issues of gender, class and sexuality without 
acknowledging the dynamics of race, and that few factors have caused more bitterness, 
division and resentment within the movement. Attempts towards solidarity of gender are 
fraught with issues of racism, and failure to acknowledge the impacts of white supremacy, the 
impacts of power and privilege, within feminism (Aniagolu, 2010). hooks (2015) outright 
accuses racism of abounding in the writings of white feminists, which she believes fail to 
understand the living conditions of women unlike themselves in race or class. Despite the 
claims of white feminists, despite how many women suffer from ‘sexist tyranny’, hooks 
(2015, p. 5) rejects the belief this forms a common bond among all women. 
Ware (1992) questions how well white women who have objected to imperialism as a 
whole, its racism as opposed to only its sexism, have been examined honestly. She believes 
only their challenges to gender have been celebrated, and that there has been ‘little interest’ in 
British women who confronted the complexities of male power and racism. This focus on 
gender issues over racial issues is echoed in accusations by hooks (2015) that interest in 
white women’s rights is kindled whenever society stirs to respond to the needs of oppressed 
non-whites. The state here prefers to aid whites, prioritising issues of gender so it does not 
have to address issues of race. 
These failures of intersectionality within white feminism are more pressing if one 
considers that black women historically experienced oppression of white supremacy more 
often from white women than men, and often in a manner far more brutal and dehumanising. 
This has only changed a little in modernity; the advances of the status of white women now 
means that the immediate supervisor, boss, or authority figure of black women is often a 
white woman (hooks, 2015). 
If white women have been shaped by the British Empire, they will have been shaped 
by its decline. Racial tensions and increases in hate crimes have been linked to the Brexit 
vote, itself in many cases a manifestation of British desire to ‘take our country back’ 
(Burnett, 2017). The economic decline of the last ten years has contributed to the far-right’s 
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nostalgic narrative, as austerity impacts not only the working class the hardest, but its 
racialised workers and communities (Cole, 2015). White supremacy’s power in institutions of 
government keeps non-whites in poverty with less opportunity (Aniagolu, 2010), what Cole 
(2015) calls part of ‘the legacy of empire’ (p.27). This poverty, meanwhile, is not part of the 
construct of ‘whiteness’ to which the white working class aspire: the white, middle class 
lifestyle associated also with ‘Englishness’. 
Again, this brings relevance to Moon (1999), claiming any white woman aspires to 
become a ‘good white girl’ (p.179) through bourgeois respectability. It raises the question of 
what tensions are experienced if this respectability is not economically attainable. While 
these pressures affect men, too, Byrne (2006) reminds us that race, gender, and class intersect 
in different ways to produce different experiences. 
Racism is not merely a by-product of poverty. hooks (2015) links them both as 
products of the exploitative hierarchies of capitalism, ‘class struggle inextricably bound to the 
struggle to end racism’ (p.3). Cole (2015) puts it more bluntly: that ‘the ruling class uses 
racist ideology to divide workers against each other’ (p.8). Influenced towards racism, the 
working class instead blame structural inequality on each other. 
Aside from this manipulation, Hage (1998) examines other reasons for more racist 
activism from white working classes than middle classes, namely that those with a high sense 
of governmental belonging have no need to deploy personal violence for national purposes. 
They are, Hage points out, ‘secure in the knowledge that the state is acting their violence for 
them’ (p.69). 
Efforts to combat racial tensions through multiculturalist or pluralist approaches to 
education or the media tend to be watered down by institutional bureaucracies (Frankenberg, 
1993), and mainstream politics adopt racist rhetoric if threatened by xenophobic extremist 
parties (Cole, 2015). Thus is Islamophobia, as encouraged by government, a product of 
Western imperialism, hegemony, and greed (Cole, 2015), a redirection of public anxiety that 
in some ways stems from the diminishing of the British Empire. 
From depictions of male immigrants as sexually and physically violent by white-
owned press (Frankenberg, 1993) to the othering of the colonised subject (Byrne, 2006), 
colonialism has impacted white racism with a narrative of the white British destined to rule 
the inferior races (Cole, 2015). But with the end of colonialism, the consequent immigration 
and changes to Britain’s position within Europe and the world, Byrne (2006) questions how 
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the imagination of Englishness and Britishness has adapted. Lopez (2005) asks the question 
directly: ‘What happens to whiteness… after it loses its colonial privileges?” (p.4). 
Hage (1998) examines acts of racist violence as means by which a nationalist assumes 
themselves the ‘master’ of this national space, enacting violence on an other to reinforce its 
identity; in other words, attacking the non-white as a means of reinforcing white Britishness. 
It is worth noting the work of Byrne (2006) on the differences between the ‘British’ and 
‘English’ identity in relation to imperialism and racism; the former more accepting of 
multiculturalism, while the latter more of a bastion of tradition and hierarchy. The women in 
her research posited ‘Englishness’ as ‘white, middle class, and rural and under threat’ from 
racialised urban spaces, a tranquil and idyllic construct of more traditional and white time 
(Byrne, 2006, p. 173). 
This idyllic construct is under threat from economic downturn, measures of austerity, 
and the decline of the British Empire itself, with all practical and ideological consequences 
thereof. Women are as susceptible as men to these pressures giving the sense of something to 
lose or already lost, from their position within society to an imagined idealised - and white - 
lifestyle. Only with a separation of the anxieties regarding the fall of Empire from racist 
ideology can this cease to manifest in racialised violence. 
Tackling racism is challenging when it is ingrained in social hierarchy, when white 
supremacism proves ‘a rhythm to the very heart of the culture’, and its confrontation would 
inevitably bring instability and anxieties (Ware & Back, 2002, p. 22). Cole (2015) concludes 
that only challenges to capitalism and imperialism can ease the burdens of racialised 
communities, while Lopez (2005) calls upon whiteness to begin to surrender ‘its position of 
mastery’ (p.21). The culpability of white women in white supremacy has been established, as 
well as their failures to address it in the fight for their own equality. They remain part of a 
system which, as it others non-whites and encourages whites to feel threatened, urges them to 
take their place on both a passive and active level to maintain hegemony. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite a lack of studies focusing upon the violence and activism of women in the 
far-right in Britain, evidence places them as perpetrators of hate crimes and members of 
groups such as the EDL or National Action (Allen, 2017). They may be a minority, but they 
are a presence, and hooks (2015) reminds us that the fact that women may not commit violent 
acts as often as men, does not negate the reality of female violence. ‘By combining the 
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aberrant with the ordinary, the peculiar with the prosaic, modern racist groups gain strength’ 
claims Blee (2003, p. 3); and the radicalisation process is driven by pressures of everyday 
lives and undercurrents of everyday hatred. 
In an age of austerity, of a desire for independence from Europe and national 
sovereignty, of the decline of Empire and the consequent social anxieties, it would be easy to 
underestimate how women have been affected. White women may be perceived as oppressed 
by the patriarchy, victims of the hegemony of white men or the violence of non-white men. 
They have nonetheless been supporters of white supremacy, either in implicit familial and 
social support, or directly, for the benefit of all whites or in pursuing the equality of white 
women at the expense of non-whites. In the examination of white supremacy’s place in the 
micro, meso, and macro levels of far-right radicalisation, there has always been a place for 
women to be affected, directly or through the men in their lives, or through wider loyalty to 
the hierarchy of white supremacy that benefits them. 
It is clear that these women have been under-researched, though what is not clear is 
why. Perhaps there is more to hooks’ (2015) belief that white women are supported by the 
state when the state must meet demands to answer structural inequality, and favours helping 
white women rather than non-whites. There is benefit to society maintaining a portrayal of 
white women as oppressed instead of oppressors, so the state may appear to take action while 
doing nothing to dismantle white supremacy. If not the state, then the work of white feminists 
has led the recent means by which white women are examined, and it often finds them 
victims of non-whites (Ware, 1992) or as confronting systemic inequality in which they are 
the oppressed (Aniagolu, 2010). There is more to be learnt from the writing of black 
feminists and other postcolonial academics as the primary means by which white women and 
their role in enforcing systematic oppressions are challenged. 
It draws attention to an inherent limitation of this research: namely, the author’s own 
whiteness. Ware and Back (2002) examine the ethics of such an enquiry; that it requires 
‘looking into the face of racism and seeing a trace of oneself reflected in its eye’ (p.59). An 
attempt to analyse white supremacist society without considering its influences upon myself 
would be, at best, disingenuous; at worst it would reproduce those same racist attitudes. It 
then becomes easy to condemn racist women as Blee’s (2000) ‘pathological individual’ 
(p.192) instead of accepting one’s own place in the pathological racism, intolerance, and 
bigotry in society. As a middle-class white woman, I benefit from the prestige and status 
granted by a white supremacist society, and am empowered by the feminism of white women 
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to fight for my own rights while being excused from any fight for equality for others. Without 
accepting one’s own culpability, one cannot effectively recognise the culpability in society at 
large. This discomfort and its difficulties are, Ware and Back (2002) claim, necessary and 
must be embraced, but this research has still been conducted from a position of privilege and 
benefit from the same hierarchical system of white supremacy that it endeavours to condemn. 
If whiteness is most visible to those disadvantaged by it (Frankenberg, 1993) then it is their 
work and findings that should be supported first in challenging white supremacy. 
Much of the study of micro and meso-level pressures focused upon the radicalisation 
of the working class, even though the view that the white working class are especially more 
xenophobic has been questioned (Flemmen & Savage, 2017). Certainly austerity and its 
manipulation by the ruling classes has contributed to the rise of groups such as the EDL, but 
further examination of the racism of more affluent, white men and women in Britain, its 
causes and consequence, would be of benefit. The above brief examination of the ‘English’ 
identity by Byrne (2006) as part of a tranquil, traditional, white middle class rural, and 
aspirational lifestyle is worthy of more research in regard to radicalisation. Its lure is felt by 
disadvantaged whites who cannot achieve it, but those who live it, benefit from it, and 
perpetuate it as desirable are playing perhaps a more significant role in widening the racial 
rifts in society. 
It benefits capitalism to fracture the racialised working classes, to force the working 
classes to bear the brunt of austerity, and to deploy global Islamophobia as a means of 
upholding modern imperialism (Cole, 2015). This renders it more than poverty that causes 
the anxieties which provoke far-right radicalisation; these are also white communities who 
feel disconnected from their own governments, feel unrepresented and unheard, and this leads 
to the populism that has prompted Brexit and the subsequent backlash against 
multiculturalism (Ford & Goodwin, 2017). Sections of white communities are radicalised by 
disconnection from their own government, and their own government’s manipulations to 
make them blame anything else. 
These are not pressures which explicitly affect women, and are often written of in 
general terms that, if they are specific, tend to focus upon men. But they do affect women; 
women feel the pressures of capitalism, the anxieties of the collapse of the British Empire and 
decline of prestige of their cultural identity; women voted for Brexit and participated in 
subsequent violence. Sometimes they are affected in different ways and with different 
outcomes, but sometimes their anxieties and vulnerabilities are much the same as those of 
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men. They have still been often ignored in the literature; sometimes implicitly by discussion 
of men’s experience as general, sometimes explicitly by the examination solely of men. 
Research might suggest them to be only approximately a fifth of the British far-right 
(Bartlett & Littler, 2011). But they are a considerably larger presence in the white 
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